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Book Review

M.A. P. Wi1lmer, Crime and Information Theory, Edinburgh and Chicago:
Edinburgh University Press and Aldine Publishing Company, 1970.

For the C01!llilU,nication researcher, Crime �nd Information Theory
should provide interesting reading.

It exemplifies a broadening of the

scope of application both of the communication paradigm and quantita
tive theory.

Let me discuss these two aspects s·eparately.

As I see it, the communication paradigm essentially requires the
researcher (a) to view his objects of analysis in their role

as senders

and receivers; (b) to study the exchange of information between them in
the expectation that it enables him (c) to discover the dynamic conse
quences of this relation.

In Crime and Information Theory, the princi

pal senders and receivers are the criminal and the police respectively.
Witnesses, the public, etc. play a mediating role.
In his second chapter, the author points to the importance of
information as a precondition to solving crimes.

Information must be

available to determine whether a crime has been committed, information
is required to delineate the population of possible suspects, and informa
tion is needed to convict the criminal.

The police thus becomes a pro

cessor of the information supplied by victims, witnesses and the public.
One of its tasks is to differentiate valuable and irrelevant clues
which poses the problem of coping with what communication researchers
call noise.
Clearly, if a criminal could conceal his behavior completely, he
could consider himself free to do whatever he pleases.

However, when he

identifies opportunities for illegal gains, when he prepares himself
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for the act, when he executes his plans, and when he enjoys the fruits
of his machinations he may leave behind evidence in the form of physi
cal traces, he may exhibit changes in overt behavior, or he may talk
to potential informers.

These are the signals which the criminal emits

and which the police tries to detect.

The various kinds of signals

and their relative strengths are discussed in Chapter Three.
Chapter Four is correctly titled "A Battle over Information" be
cause, consistent with the connnunication paradigm, the criminal's
strategy will be one of minimizing the strength of the signal emitted
while the police's strategy aims at amplifying the relevant signals
it receives.

Either behavior is associated with costs and gains which

leads the author to a kind of game theory representation of the situa
For example, a thief may have the option of selling his goods

tion.

for a high profit to a reputable dealer with a high probability of being
suspected of the crime, photographed or reported to the police, or he
may offer them for a marginal profit to a shady character, emitting, in
the author's terms, a weak signal with a low probability of being de
tected.

Naturally, the risks that criminals are willing to take deter

mine also the police's choice of search strategies.
"Deterrence and Prevention" are discussed in the fifth chapter.

This

chapter goes beyond the simple sender= criminal--receiver=police relation
ship because it concerns itself with the effects of knowledge among
criminals about each other and about police behavior.

For example, when

a crime is connnitted by a team, both payoff and signal strength are likely
to be greater than for criminals working in isolation.

When such groups

are formed, rational criminals presumably bargain for their roles by
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considering how much each increases the payoff without significantly
increasing the strength of the signal jointly emitted.

The author

argues that various means for amplifying the strength of signals may
help in deterring large-scale crime.

Other recommendations refer to

situations of part conflict -- part cooperation between criminal and
police, such as the police's involvement in rackets,

and between

criminal and victim, such as in the situation of blackmail.

Either

situation is likely to absorb the information that could be made availa
ble to the legal authorities.

The deterrent effect would be, presumably,

achieved by incentives to break the information blockage.
The last chapter is quite unrelated to the preceding five, in
that it presents an interpretation of avai,lable crime statistics.
To present the quantitative part of Crime and Information Theory
the author chooses to let "mathematical notes" follow the verbal elabo
ration of quantitative concepts.

The reader not interested in this

mode of thinking can skip them.

He will not lose the thread of the

argument but may not see the implications of the approach.

Conversely,

for the mathematically-minded reader, the notes are self contained and
merely omit references to the author's motivations and examples.
The basic ideas are not new.

For the police there is an initially

large population of possible suspects.

A received signal, say, indicating

that the suspect was male, Caucasian and 6 feet tall, cuts the size of
this initial population down to a smaller number.

The difference between

the logarithm of the initial number of suspects and the logarithm of
the remaining number of suspects is a measure of the information value
of the signal or of its strength.
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Obviously, some informers are reliable while others may not be
so regarded; some signals are interpreted correctly while others may
lead to wrong conclusions.

The author considers these possibilities

by assigning probabilities to the partition of the suspect population
which a received signal invokes.

Here then the author deviates from

Shannon's Mathematical Theory of Connnunication.

While in Shannon proba

bilities have frequency interpretations, in the book under review they
are regarded as subjective and as resulting from induction.
The remaining mathematical approach, is an elaboration of game theory
and bargaining theory.

For example, the known payoffs of the combina

tions of the police's strategies with the criminal's behavioral alterna
tives permit the conflict over information to be treated as a game.

And

when the options of two criminals who bargain for roles in a planned
crime are presented in a payoff/signal strength space, the joint maximum
can be identified as the criminal's rational meeting-p9int which the
police will have to face.
Let me now discuss some of the shortcomings.

As

far as the appli-

cation of the connnunication paradigm is concerned, the book is quite
imaginative and on the whole successful, though, from the point of view
of an external observer, it is biased in favor of the police.

This is

not just a consequence of the fact that the research was undertaken
while the author was a member of the Police Research and Planning Branch
of Britain's Home Office; it is presumably because the police -- unlike
the criminal -- has a convenient unit of enumeration:
possible suspects in its records.

the number of
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The author considers all signals as mapped into a property space
of pos·sible subjects without discussing how this mapping comes about.
What is omitted here is precisely what would help to make the police
a more efficient processor of information.

The quantity of information

as measured by the author may provide a criterion for the police's
success but does not provide insights into the process.
When one tries to do justice to the two principal communicators,
one has to consider at least the following information processes, of
which the author discusses only the "emission of signals" by the crimi
nal and their selective effects of the "police's records of the population":

_____..,

emission
of signa s

police's
environment

interpretaticim:~,
of c ues::�

sp�ce
criminal's

,overt
,___behavior
".'.'-"

For example, much of the police's effort consists of selective "search
activity" with the possibility of "evidence" being created rather than
discovered.

There can also be no doubt that the police's "overt beha

vior" provides signals of various strengths to the criminal who in
turn may be involved in the "interpretation of clues," etc.

These possi

bilities are omitted in the book, perhaps because the communication para
digm is applied too narrowly.
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For an appropriate information theory of criminal detection, the
real difficulty lies in the conceptualizatLon of the police's environ
ment, i.e., the space representing all possible clues and their inter
relations which the police might consider relevant for interpretation.
This would be a prerequisite for studying how this space is interpreted
into selections among possible suspects.

Similarly, to understand the

criminal's behavior, the interpretation of the criminal's environment
and consequent reactions must be described.

The author does not consi

der such problems.
The mathematical notes, particularly concerning the basic measures
of information, seem straightforward.
meaning.

But a major weakness is their

Clearly, when the population of possible suspects is large,

more uncertainty regarding the criminal prevails and more search effort
is needed than when that population is small.

Now, when a signal sug

gests an uneven distribution of inductive probabilities over the set of
suspects, the author correctly argues that information is received.
However, the consequent search effort need not be less than before the
signal was received.

Eve n the simplest Sherlock Holmes story teaches

us that an individual who appears to have a low probability of involve
ment on logical grounds may often be precisely the one who is sought.
Thus the reduction of the search effort is related to the quantity of
received information only when the implied evidence is unshakably conclu
sive.
A similar point may be made with regard to contradictory informa

tion.

The police is always confronted with this possibility, but the

author's information theory is not equipped to handle it.

This is
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particularly the case with meta-information, e.g., information about
the reliability of an assertion or of the reliability of an informant.
In addition, when discussing the battle over information, the
author seems to'use game theory rather uncritically.

For example, the

police with its potentially large supply of officers would probably
be most successful if it could avoid making choices among strategies
and follow all of them simultaneously.

Considering that such a situation

could not any more be considered a game, generally, the police would
presumably want to avoid engaging in a situation that is game-like.
Assuming that both criminal and police confront each other in a
game-like situation, the successful application of game theory is made
difficult by two further peculiarities of the situation.

First, it is

very unlikely that sueµ games are zero-sum games for which solutions
are known; i.e., it is very unlikely that the police gains what the
criminal loses and vice versa.
generally quite different.

The currencies of both players are

Second, the author's verbal concern for the

information transmitted from the criminal to the police is suddenly
completely omitted in the formalization of the situation as a game.
Players now seem to be required to make choices independently of each
other.

This discards the author's main contribution.

In conclusion, the application of the conununication paradigm to a
relatively unusual domain makes Crime and Information Theory worth
reading.

The reader should know, though, that the book deals primarily

with the police's side of the story and of that only with the product
of its search and information processing activity, not with crime and
criminals.

The quantitative theory contains interesting ideas that

